The notion of reversibility, or backward determinism, for cellular automata is investigated. Various intuitively different definitions are offered which coalesce in three inequivalent properties. Two of these are the well-known injectivity and surjeetivity properties of the global transition function of a cellular automaton. We complete the investigation for one-dimensional cellular automata giving effective conditions for the third property. We end with some examples and comments on the relations between local and global phaenomena in cellular automata.
I. INTRODUCTION
As is well known, the concept of reversibility, or backward determinism (we will use the terms synonymously) plays an important role in many branches of physics. It is especially connected with a discrepancy between micro-and macrosystems even within the bounds of classical mechanics. Something analogous seems to take place in cellular automata. Indeed, some time ago, Burks [1] asked the question: Is it necessary that such properties as self-reproduction and universality of computation require an essential irreversibility of the cellular automata for which they hold ? Preliminary to an answer to this question and of independent interest seems to be an analysis of effective conditions necessary and sufficient for reversibility of cellular automata. For some time we have been looking into this problem [2, 3] and have established some such conditions for one-dimensional cellular automata. It is to be observed, as will be expounded more fully later, that while the notion of forward determinism is straightforward, a number of inequivalent candidates are present for that of backward determinism. We feel that the present investigation extends and consolidates a number of recent results in this direction [4] [5] [6] . 
r: cg __~ cg ~_~ [r(c)](i) = a(c(N(X, i))).
In the following we will always suppose that the elementary automaton is endowed with a quiescent state q0 and that its transition function is such that a(q 0 ,..., q0) = q0 9 A configuration c is finite when c(i) = qo except for a finite number of cells. We will denote with c~ the class of finite configurations. As is well known, the condition a(qo,.-., qo) ~ qo is a necessary and sufficient condition that r(c) E ~ if c ~ c~. The frontier of a finite region R, FR, is the set of cells not in R such that either they are neighbors of cells of R or they have neighbors in R:
A transition function r: c~ ~ cg need not a priori be determined, as we determined it, through an elementary transition function a and a neighborhood index X. For instance, it may result from a a and an X which are not constant over the cellular space (in which case the cellular automaton is not homogeneous). Following Richardson [5] , we will say that a transition function is local if it is indeed a possible transition function for some cellular automaton according to the above definition.
III. THE NOTION OF REVERSIBILITY
What is now to be understood with backward determinism for cellular automata ? In the case of automata it means the following. For any n and for all input strings X of length n, if the automaton goes from state q to state q' under x, then it will go from state q' to state q under the palindrome of x and reversing time, i.e. inverting the transition function of the automaton. This carries over the notion that if time is reversed there is no means of ascertaining this fact through the examination of the behavior of a reversible automaton. For cellular automata, as we define them in this paper, in the first place there are no inputs--they are more like clocks, which in the noncellular case are always ultimately periodic and, at least for their strongly connected part, reversible--and in the second place, the notion equivalent to that of state is the configuration--an infinite object. Here, the similarity lies more with classical mechanics than with automata. However, pushing the analogy too far may be dangerous. For instance, any given (finite) configuration in a cellular automaton has a definite shape and can be endowed as well, by an observer with an independent knowledge of z, with functions in the sense that the modifications induced in the environment by the evolution of that configuration can be seen as peculiar of that shape. This is exactly the attitude of Von Neumann when he refers to the various parts of his self-reproducing automaton as organs. In fact there does not seem to be another sensible way of talking of "parts" of a cellular automaton. In any case these organs or systems, like any other configuration in that cellular automaton, evolve according to ~.
Thus in this view r is the counterpart of the laws of dynamics, the Hamiltonian equations, say, while the shape of the system is the counterpart of the Hamiltonian function. However, one may also regard any given configuration as the specification of the initial conditions of a system which now amounts to the whole cellular automaton. In this view ~-is the counterpart of the Hamiltonian function and the general definitions of a cellular automata are the counterpart of the laws of dynamics. This is more satisfying but the similarity ends when one considers reversibility. In this case, for cellular automata it would be a property of the particular system, while in classical mechanics it is a property of the laws of dynamics (shocks aside) valid for every mechanical system. Thus the cellular automata might be used to model various "possible worlds," some reversible, some not, and it is perhaps with this particular interpretation in mind that Burks [1] asked his question. Furthermore, one may well ask whether "objects" like the "gliders" of "Life" [7] are reversible in the following sense. It is well known that a glider moves in a welt-defined direction and it is perfectly possible to have another glider which traces back the path of the first one; but a different glider or, if you want, the same turned about. If, instead, time is reversed, the glider does not retrograde. In fact no single configuration exists which can be taken as a unique predecessor of any step of the glider. However, there might, even in a nonreversible cellular automaton, be some reversible configurations which, one would say, would possess a higher degree of individuation than the others: they could be traced back by a Lagrangian observer.
We will now discuss the various possible meanings of "reversible" for homogeneous cellular automata. The first notion is identical with injectivity of r and expresses the idea that each configuration which has been reached must come from a single configuration. Formally, we have: R.I: C/is R.1 if r is one to one.
We may further require that r -t be a local transition function; that is, the backwardgoing cellular automaton is still a cellular automaton although generally a different one. (If z-* = ~, then z(z(c)) = c for all c so that either the configurations are stable or they are oscillators with period 2. Clearly, for such a strong notion of reversibility, Burk's question must be answered in the affirmative.) RL: 0/is RL if r-* is a local transition function.
The third notion of reversibility is based on Moore's well-known concept of mutually erasable configurations [8] or, equivalently [6] , of indistinguishable configurations: R.2: ~ is R.2 if for all finite regions R and for all pairs of configurations q, c2 the following holds:
or, informally, ~ is R.2 if there are no pairs of mutually erasable configurations.
Restricting oneself to finite configurations only, which are the ones of interest and the only reason to introduce the quiescent state, one has corresponding to R.I: Thus in R.3f one does allow the possibility that some finite configurations are generated by nonfinite ones, while R.3ff requires that every finite configuration has at least--and as we shall see, exactly--one finite predecessor. The schema of implications that holds is shown in Fig. 1 Implications between various definitions of reversibility.
To show RLf =~ R.1, we will use Richardson's [5] formalism; one has only to prove that each nonfinite configuration also has a unique predecessor; suppose to the contrary that q, Thus only three extensionally different concepts subsist relative to backward determinism: R.1 or global injectivity, R.lf or finite injectivity and in between R.3ff or finite surjectivity.
IV. A DECISION PROCEDURE FOR FINITE SURJECTIVlTY
Decision procedures for R.1 and R.3--thus for R.lf and all the equivalent properties-in the case of unidimensional automata have been given by Amoroso and Part [4] . We had independently developed a decision procedure for R.2f in [2, 3] and with the same technique we now give a decision procedure for R.3ff. Our proof techniques work only for the unidimensional case. Indeed, all attempts to extend them to more than one dimension have been to no avail. We will use only the neighborhood X --~ {0, 1} without loss of generality as shown by the next theorem, which is an adaptation of much more general results by Smith [9] .
THEOREM. Given a cellular automaton O/1 =-(A1, El, X1, T1), there exists a cellular automaton ~ = (A2, E 1, {0, 1}, r2) such that 6g t is R.3ff iff Og 2 is R.3ff. N(X 1 ,j) But c2'*-~ c~, where Vj:
which gives c~(j) = ai(cl(N(Xl,j --min XI))) so that corresponding configurations have corresponding successors except for a shift of --min X t . It follows at once that 0/1 is R.3ff iff C{ 2 is. Last, the finite character of the construction of A~ and ao-proves the last assertion of the theorem.
We now introduce a useful auxiliary notion.
DEFINITION. Let ~ = (A, E 1, {0, I}, 7). From now on the elements of A will be denoted directly by their indices and each triple (i,j, k), such that a(i,j) -~ k, will be called a base and indicated by Ki~; so (0, 0, 0) will be denoted by 0o0-Bases differing only for their indices will be said of the same type.
There are, of course, (#A)o-bases. One associates with every configuration a sequence of bases by substituting to every pair of states (with overlaps) the corresponding base. DEFINITION. A sequent of a base is a base which can be concatenated to the right of the given base, that is, a base with the first index identical with the second index of the given base--symmetrically for the antecedent.
Any base has exactly #A sequents or antecedents. If two bases have a common antecedent (sequent), they have all the antecedents (sequents) in common.
DEFINITION. An initial base is a sequent of 00o directly or through a finite sequence of bases of type 0. A final base is symmetrically defined by substituting antecedent for sequent.
We consider now a labeled tree associated with each cellular automaton with X = {0, 1}. Each node will have exactly #M branches labeled 0, l .... , #A, respectively. Therefore, to each finite configuration of the automaton there will uniquely correspond a finite path in the tree and vice versa. The root is labeled with the set of initial bases of type 0. If node i is the immediate predecessor of nodej by branch k ~ #A, then the label of node j is the set of bases of type K which are sequents of some bases in the label of node i, if any; otherwise the label is empty. Proof. Take any node p. To the path from the root up to nodep there corresponds a finite configuration. Since ~ is R.3ff, such configuration, when translated into a sequence of bases, must begin with an initial base and end with a final base. Hence the label associated with p has a final base in it.
To each finite configuration c there corresponds a pathP0, Pl ,..., Pn in the associated tree. p~ has a final base in its label. Take any base in the label of P,~-I which is an antecedent of this one. Going backward down to P0 we construct a finite sequence of bases such that the first one is initial (of type 0, of course) and the last one final. The configuration to which such a sequence of bases is associated obviously is finite and is a predecessor of c. Hence 6~ is R.3ff.
All the properties involved in the above proof (being a sequent, being initial, etc.) are clearly decidable. To transform it into an algorithm one only needs an upper bound on the depth of the search for labels without final bases in the associated tree. Proof. Take any node at depth d > d o and the unique path from the root up to that node. There are d + 1 ~ n(2 ~ --1) labels in that branch and at most n(2'* --1) labels with a final base, which is the total number of nonempty labels. Therefore, in the above path at least one label appears twice. Now observe that for any given label, the labels immediately following in the tree are uniquely determined. So the terminal node of the above path has a label which has already appeared in the initial segment of the tree and as such all labels of the nodes immediately following in the tree have a final base in them.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is difficult to assess the relative importance and interest of the various characterizations of reversibility which have been given. It seems that R.1 is the most significant because of the fact that the inverse transition function is a local transition function as well. One would then also mention that once one specifies a proper subclass of configurations as of particular interest, i.e., the finite configurations, one might as well inquire into other classes; for instance into that class of individualized configurations, already alluded to, which have a uniquely defined history in a not generally reversible cellular automaton. That such research would not be trivially empty is shown by the following nontrivial, albeit very simple, example. is not R. If because, for instance -'-01210"'-and -'-01110 "'" both go into '." 011110 "--. However, one can easily convince oneself that there are no vanishing configurations and any packet of 2's moves to the left in forward and to the right in backward operation. As a final remark we give four cellular automata with the properties shown in Table I . Clearly, R.4 is implied by all other forms of reversibility and, by Example 2 of Skyum, does not imply any. Its decidability status, even for the one-dimensional case, is open.
